Member News

Ashton KCJ Solicitors is delighted to announce a number of new Associate appointments from within the firm.

Seven members of staff across a range of departments have been appointed as Associates, having successfully completed Ashton KCJ’s Development Programme. This involved a structured learning programme delivered by some of the UK’s best trainers, course work and 360 degree feedback.

Congratulations go to Sharon Allison and Julie Crossley from the Clinical Negligence team in Thetford, Sue Bailey and Elisabeth Sneade from the Family department in Norwich and Cambridge respectively, Ian Barnard in the Ipswich Commercial Property team, Tom Ranson from the Personal Injury team in Ipswich and Robert Tiffen, who works within the Dispute Resolution team in Norwich.

Ashton KCJ’s Chief Executive, Simon Smith says: “We are delighted to announce these appointments, which are richly deserved. They follow a number of commercial solicitor appointments and the acquisition of franchise specialists, John Chambers & Co earlier this year. This underscores the strength and growth of the firm as we approach the first anniversary of our merger in October.”

Employment solicitor Sam Greenhalgh reports on a recent decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT), which considers when it is appropriate to identify a ‘pool’ from which employees are selected for redundancy.

The employer in this case, a golf club, decided to make its club steward redundant in order to save costs. The employer consulted with the employee and subsequently confirmed his redundancy following a number of meetings with him. His duties, which included the management of the bar area, were to be undertaken by other members of the catering and bar staff.

The employee brought a claim for unfair dismissal, which was upheld by an employment tribunal. The tribunal concluded that in making the club steward redundant, without considering whether to identify a pool of employees from which to select for redundancy, was not within the “range of reasonable responses” required for the dismissal to be fair.

The employer appealed to the EAT. The EAT confirmed that there is no requirement to identify a pool for selection in a redundancy situation, and it might be perfectly reasonable for the employer to consider a single employee for redundancy. The tribunal in this case had failed to consider whether, given the nature of his job as a club steward, it was reasonable for the employer not to consider identifying a wider pool of employees from which to select. The employer’s appeal was upheld and the case remitted for a rehearing.

Comment

There is no requirement to follow a selection process in a redundancy situation, in circumstances where an individual’s role is no longer required and they are the only person carrying out that role. Provided the employee is properly consulted with prior to confirming the redundancy, the dismissal will be fair. However, it might still be necessary as part of the consultation process to consider whether it is appropriate to ‘bump’ another employee, making them redundant instead in order to retain the services of the employee whose role is no longer required.

If a number of employees carry out similar duties, then it will be more appropriate to identify a pool of employees from which to select for redundancy.

A copy of the judgment is available here

Steeles Law Head of Real Estate Michael Fahy and Trainee Solicitor Laura Tanguay consider the High Court decision of Kettel v Bloomfield [2012] EWCA 1422 (Ch) on the right to use car parking spaces and the landlord’s ability to reallocate spaces.

The Claimants in this case held leasehold interests in eight flats in a development known as City Walk. Each lease granted the tenant the right to park in a designated parking space.

The freehold owner of City Walk obtained planning permission to build a new housing block; the location of which would be in the same spot as the parking spaces. The landlord therefore wrote to each tenant to explain that their parking spaces were being reallocated and promptly fenced off the area.

The tenants did not consent to their parking spaces being moved and sought an injunction to restrain the landlord.

Type of ‘right’

The first question considered by the court was the nature of the right granted. Did the parking spaces form part of the property demised by the lease, or did the tenants merely have easements to use the spaces? The distinction was important as the extent of the rights granted determined the extent of the landlord’s limitation in developing the land. If the spaces formed part of the demise, the landlord would be prevented from building on them or even in the airspace above them.

The court held that the terms of the lease did not amount to a demise of the car parking spaces.

The case law on whether or not a right to park a car can exist as an easement is far from clear. The rule established in the case of Batchelor v Marlow [2003] 4 All ER 78 stated that a right to park a car could not be an easement if it left the servient owner without any ‘reasonable use’ of his land. However, the subsequent decision of Moncrieff v Jamieson [2008] 4 All ER 752 criticised the ‘reasonable use’ test and held that the correct test should be whether the servient owner retains “possession and control” of the land subject to the reasonable exercise of the easement.

However, the court in this case confirmed that it was obliged to apply the ‘reasonable use’ test as set out in Batchelor. It was held that the rights did not deprive the landlord of all reasonable use of the land – the landlord could cross the space, enter the space to maintain or resurface it, lay conducting media under the space and install overhead projections such as wires. The rights were therefore upheld as easements.

Movement of the spaces

None of the leases expressly stated that the landlord could move the spaces and the court held that no such right could be implied. The court looked to the case of Greenwhich NHS Trust v London & Quadrant Housing Association [1998] 1 WLR 1749 in confirming that the landlord could not unilaterally extinguish an easement by providing an equivalent easement.

Remedy

The landlord argued that damages were an appropriate remedy as the loss was, in his opinion, trivial given that the tenants would be given spaces new only yards away. However, because the landlord had not made the offer of new spaces in a way that would be binding, the court held that it had sought to escape the burden of the rights granted and consequently allowed the injunction.

Practical solutions

If a tenant has a right to park in a designated parking space there is no right to reallocate the space, even if the new space is only a short distance away and equally as convenient. The safest course of action is to grant parking rights in relation to spaces ‘designated by the landlord from time to time’

If you require advice on any issues raised in this article please contact Michael Fahy on 020 7421 1720 or [email protected].

Norwich firm of solicitors, Leathes Prior, have sponsored Jack Coxall, a teenager from Frettenham, for his sponsored 130-mile bike ride on 1 & 2 September 2012 from Norwich to Great Ormond Street Hospital. Jack suffered serious injuries to his pancreas and spleen in December 2009 and was in Great Ormond Street Hospital for six weeks. As a result of ongoing complications he is now unable to pursue his preferred career in the army and missed a substantial amount of school.

Dave Richards, the personal injury solicitor at Leathes Prior acting for Jack, is particularly impressed that he has come so far. “Jack really has made exceptional progress since I took on his case. I would not have believed that he would go on to do a 130-mile bike ride when I first heard about what happened, but it really is a credit to him and to Great Ormond Street Hospital, and it’s great that he’s decided to give back like this”.

Whilst Jack was lying in Great Ormond Street Hospital, he said to himself that once he recovered he would raise money for the hospital itself, as a way of giving something back. He has since endured a long recovery process but is now confident that he can complete the journey.

His mother, Samantha Coxall, is naturally very nervous for Jack, but at the same time has expressed how proud she is of him, after everything he has been through.

To sponsor Jack, visit www.justgiving.com/JackJourney

Steeles Law is pleased to announce that the firm is exhibiting at the popular Diss on View business event, presented by Diss Business Forum (DBF) and Hales Group Ltd once again this year.

Steeles Law is pleased to announce that the firm is exhibiting at the popular Diss on View business event, presented by Diss Business Forum (DBF) and Hales Group Ltd once again this year.

We would like to invite all clients and contacts in the Diss area to come and visit us at stand number 7 at the exhibition, which will take place on Friday 14 September, 1.30 – 5.00pm at the Park Hotel, Diss.

Visitors can also book in to attend a networking brunch from 11.30am – 1.30pm before Richard Bacon, MP for South Norfolk and Graham Minshull, Diss Town Mayor open the event at 1.30pm. At the end of the day, there’s another opportunity to combine business with pleasure at a Cocktail Workshop from 5.30pm.

Details of the day and booking forms for both networking events can be found on the DBF website www.dbf.org.uk.

We look forward to seeing you there.

Survival Systems International UK (SSI) has completed the refurbishment of three 50-man lifeboat capsules from the Global Sante Fe Galaxy rig at its UK base at Great Yarmouth.

All three were transported together by road from Scotland to be worked on simultaneously in Norfolk while the North Sea rig was being revamped in the Nigg fabrication yard on the Cromarty Firth.

“We were delighted to be given the work by Transocean, the world’s largest drilling contractor, and even happier to report that we finished on schedule within a tight deadline,” said Andy Dickson, SSI UK’s operations manager.

“It’s meant the workshop has been particularly busy with all three capsules being worked on alongside another major contract.”

Every component from each of the capsules was thoroughly checked through SSI’s ‘traffic light’ assessment – green for OK, yellow for potential refurbishment and red for replacement. Safety testing was also incorporated into the six-week project.

“It was ideal for us to get the job as the capsules were all built by our parent company in the United States so we were very familiar with their design, equipment and layout,” said Andy.

The GSF Galaxy, a harsh environment deepwater jack-up platform, is undergoing a three-month refurbishment, the first oil rig for nine years at the Nigg yard.

Steeles Law Head of Real Estate Michael Fahy and Trainee Solicitor Laura Tanguay consider the High Court decision of E.ON UK plc v Gilesports Ltd [2012] EWHC 2172 (Ch) on landlord’s consent for assignment.

Introduction

This case is a useful illustration of how not to assign a lease. We outline the facts of this case and review what can happen when a tenant assigns its sublease to another party without first obtaining the immediate landlord’s proper consent.

Consent to Assign

It is typical for a lease to provide (as this sublease did) that an assignment may only be completed with the landlord’s prior written consent, such consent usually taking the form of a Licence to Assign. A tenant must therefore make an application to its landlord for it to consider. Under section 1(3) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1988, landlords must consider and respond to a tenant’s request within a reasonable time frame, and, if consent is refused, provide the tenant with the reasons for such refusal in writing.

The Facts

In this case, an application for the landlord’s consent had been sent via email, which was not in accordance with the terms of the sublease which incorporated section 196 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (as amended by the Recorded Delivery Service Act 1962) for the service of notices (i.e. that notices must be left at the landlord’s last known place of business or sent by Recorded Delivery). The landlord did not respond to the request and so no consent was received by the tenant. Despite this, 11 days after submitting its request, the tenant completed the assignment of the sublease. As consent had not been given, the landlord sought to recover rent from the tenant post assignment. In court, the tenant argued that the landlord had unreasonably delayed in giving consent and it should therefore be deemed to have consented.

Judgment

It was held that service of the tenant’s request by email was not sufficient to trigger the landlord’s statutory duty to consider the application under section 1(3) LTA 1988. The application should have been served in accordance with the provisions of the sublease. Even if service by email had been sufficient, the court stated that 11 days was too short a period to hold that the landlord had been unreasonably in its delay. Unfortunately for the tenant, the bad news did not end there; as the assignment was never registered with the Land Registry (in breach of covenant) and so by virtue of section 7 LRA 2002, the assignment of the sublease became void and reverted back to the tenant. As such, the tenant was still the current tenant (and not the ‘former tenant’) for the purposes of the section 17 notice for rent demanded under LTCA 1995, and therefore, its liability for rent arrears was not limited by this section.

If you require advice on any issues raised in this article please contact Michael Fahy on 020 7421 1720 or [email protected].

Leading East of England law firm Birketts LLP are pleased to announce that Matthew Gowen has joined the firm as a consultant within the firm’s Corporate Criminal Defence team.

Matthew is a practising barrister with 18 Red Lion Court, London, having been called to the Bar in 1992. He will continue with his practice in chambers in addition to working with the firm with immediate effect.

He appears frequently as a leading junior both for the defence and the Crown in serious criminal cases and has also advised on and appeared in cases of regulatory crime, including health & safety and environmental matters. He is a Grade 4 Advocate (the highest rank) for the Crown Prosecution Service.

On his appointment, Matthew said: “I am delighted to be joining Birketts LLP as a consultant. The firm’s sharp strategic focus and its commitment to building and developing its high-quality Corporate Criminal Defence team provides an appealing mix of challenge and opportunity at this stage of my career. I am looking forward to working with the team to develop the firm’s presence and capabilities.”

Laura Thomas, head of the Corporate Criminal Defence team at Birketts, added “We are delighted Matthew will be working with us. Matthew brings over 20 years of experience to the firm and a barrister of his calibre and reputation will help us to continue building and developing our Corporate Criminal Defence practice. His knowledge and experience on a wide range of criminal and regulatory cases will support our significant work in this market. Matthew’s engagement follows our recent appointment of Frank Sykes, ex-HSE Principal Inspector who joined the team as a consultant in May and is already significantly benefitting both existing and new clients with his expertise. There are exciting times ahead for the team!”

Steeles Law Head of Real Estate Michael Fahy and Trainee Solicitor Laura Tanguay consider the Court of Appeal decision of Ener-G Holdings plc v Hormell [2012] EWCA Civ 1059 (31 July 2012) on personal service and ‘permissive’ drafting.

In this case, the Court of Appeal considered an appeal by Ener-G Holdings Plc (“Ener-G”) of the decision of the court of first instance which found that Ener-G’s £2 million claim for breach of warranty was time barred.

Key clauses

The two key clauses in the agreement between the two parties stated:

1. Ener-G must give written notice of any breach of warranty claim to Mr Hormell (the Respondent) by ‘the second anniversary of completion’ (i.e. by 2 April 2010);

2. Proceedings in respect of that claim must be issued and served not later than twelve months after the date of that notice; and

3. Any such notice ‘may be served by delivering it personally or by sending it by pre-paid recorded delivery’.

The facts

Ener-G served its notice for breach of warranty on Mr Hormell in two different ways. First, a process server attended Mr Hormell’s home address on 30 March 2010 to personally serve the notice. Because no one was home at the time, the process server left the envelope in the front porch on a table. Later that afternoon, Mr Hormell found the envelope, opened it, and read the notice. Later that day, a second notice was sent to Mr Hormell by recorded delivery which was deemed received on 1 April 2010.

Ener-G commenced court proceedings in respect of the claim on 29 March 2011. The claim was served by means of personal service and was deemed served on 31 March 2011. Therefore, if the notice delivered by the process server on 30 March 2010 was found to be properly served, Ener-G’s claim was time barred as it would not have been served on Mr Hormell within 12 months of the notice. If, on the other hand, the notice delivered by the process service was found not to be properly served, then the clock for serving the claim would not have started running until 1 April 2010 – meaning that Ener-G’s claim was not time barred.

‘Delivering it personally’

Ener-G argued that ‘delivering it personally’ required that the notice be handed personally to the intended recipient. As this did not happen, the notice delivered by the process server and left on the table was invalid. Mr Hormell contended that it was enough for the notice to have been left at the property (albeit not handed to him in person) and so the notice should be upheld as valid. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the court of first instance and ruled that ‘delivering it personally’ required the notice to be handed to Mr Hormell personally, and the actions of the process server did not satisfy this requirement.

Permissive rather than exclusive

However, the wording of the clause in this agreement stated that the parties ‘may’ serve the notice by delivering it personally or by sending it by pre-paid recorded delivery. This wording was permissive rather than exclusive, referring to “may” rather than “must” or “shall”, and therefore Ener-G were free to use any method of service and were not limited to the two methods specified. Accordingly, the actions of the process server did in fact constitute good service for the purposes of the agreement and consequently Ener-G’s claim was time barred. The decision of the Court was split 2:1, with Lord Justice Longmore’s dissenting view “that it is counter-intuitive to conclude, when the parties have taken the trouble to spell out [how a notice can be served] that a notice can be served … in any other way the deliverer of the notices chooses.”

Practical guidance

1. Do not leave the service of important documents to the last minute where time is of the essence. Lord Justice Gross commented by saying, “I fear that by leaving service until so late in the day, the Appellant has been the author of its own misfortune.”

2. Be aware that ‘personal service/delivery’ means service to the addressee in person and not just delivery to the addressee’s premises.

3. Avoid using permissive words such as ‘may’ in an agreement if what is really intended is that the parties shall or must do something.

If you require advice on any issues raised in this article please contact Michael Fahy on 020 7421 1720 or [email protected].

Steeles Law Head of Planning & Environment David Merson looks at the Coalition’s proposals to revise the planning obligations regime to try and help kick-start stalled development proposals.

It is suggested that some two thirds of approved building projects in the last five years have either been dumped or stalled as a result of planning obligation costs making development proposals uneconomic in the wake of the credit crunch and subsequent recession.

The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, Eric Pickles, is therefore sending ‘troubleshooters’ into 13 local planning authorities to see if re-opening and re-negotiating section 106 planning obligation deals could provide a means of getting some projects back on track.

Coupled with this, the Coalition has announced a consultation exercise involving amendments to the Town and Country Planning (Modification and Discharge of Planning Obligations) Regulations 1992 SI 1992/2832.

The proposal will allow planning obligations entered into prior to 6th April 2010 to be re-negotiated in order to unlock development projects which were negotiated in more buoyant economic conditions but which are currently not economically viable.

Section 106 of the Town Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended) allows local planning authorities, usually before granting planning permission, to enter into planning obligations with developers. Those obligations can be voluntarily renegotiated at any time but, under the terms of the Regulations and absent any agreement, can be subject to a formal application process to reconsider the terms when it is five years old. Appeal provisions apply where such an application has been refused.

It is anticipated that the new regime will operate to allow planning obligations entered into on or before the relevant date to be re-negotiated. This provision removes the five-year restriction in the current Regulations from those planning obligations but those more recent planning obligations entered into after that date will not be able to benefit from this change. They must either be re-negotiated by agreement or wait until the expiration of the five-year period and then go through the existing formal modification and discharge procedure.

Developers looking to rely on the revised provisions, if and when enacted, will still need to ensure that the substantive legal test is met and there will, according to the consultation document, need to be strong justification for any change(s) sought. The modified obligation must still be acceptable in that it must still be necessary to make the development acceptable in planning terms.

Note however that local planning authorities cannot be forced to re-negotiate planning obligations. They would be expected to act reasonably and to consider and determine such an application applying proper planning considerations. But they might refuse to do so or they might conclude that there was still clear justification for the obligation to remain unmodified. This would engage the appeal provisions and could also, where the relevant grounds arose, permit an application for judicial review.

Details of the consultation exercise can be found here. The consultation period runs until 8th October 2012.

If you require further information or advice on any issues raised in this article or any other planning & environmental matter please contact David Merson on 020 7421 1720 or [email protected]

Ian Robotham, Associate in the Dispute Resolution team at Steeles Law, reports on recent developments on the “Interest Rate Swap Scandal” that has become big news over recent months and gives his opinion on matters.

Update

Since first reported by Nigel Lubbock, Head of the Company and Commercial team at Steeles Law in 2010 (click here for link to that article), complaints and allegations against the country’s major financial institutions that they mis-sold derivative (hedge) products to SME’s have gathered pace.

Recently, one particular broadsheet newspaper has given significant media coverage to the issue and a self-help action group of affected SME’s has been set up to champion the cause for its members. In addition, MP’s have debated the issue in the House of Commons and litigation continues in the UK Courts.

All of the above culminated in a two month review of the issue by the regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), the results of which were issued in a report published on its website on 29 June 2012.

Outcome of the Review

In its review, the FSA found serious failings in the sale of interest rate hedging products by the major financial institutions.

In particular, the FSA found concerns regarding (a) inappropriate sales of more complex varieties of interest rate products, in particular Structured Collar products (click here for a link to a previous article by Steeles Law in which we explained the broad categories of products in more detail), and (b) poor sales practices in the selling of other interest rate hedging products.

The FSA further found that, where sold to ‘non-sophisticated’ customers (see further below for a definition in this regard) who may lack expertise and understanding of the product, the sale of some interest rate hedging products may be inappropriate.

To attempt to resolve the above concerns, the FSA has agreed with the four largest UK retail banks (those being Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds and RBS) that they will:-

(i) provide fair and reasonable redress to non-sophisticated customers who were sold Structured Collars on or after 1 December 2001;

(ii) review sales to non-sophisticated customers of other interest rate hedging products (except Caps or Structured Collars) sold on or after 1 December 2001; and

(iii) review the sale of Caps if a complaint is made by a non-sophisticated customer.

These steps are to be carried out under the scrutiny of an independent reviewer overseen by the FSA.

The following link will take you to the FSA’s full review:-

https://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/interest-rate-hedging-products.pdf

In addition, on 23 July 2012, the FSA announced that 7 other UK banks (Allied Irish (UK), Bank of Ireland, Clydesdale and Yorkshire banks, Co-operative Bank, Northern Bank and Santander UK) have also agreed to the same resolution as the four major UK banks.

In its review, the FSA envisages a process whereby the banks; appoint an independent reviewer, contact customers it deems those customers fall within the scope of the agreement with the FSA (i.e. non-sophisticated customers), provide redress where appropriate and review the sales of other interest rate products (again providing redress where appropriate).

Comments

In our opinion, the review is to be welcomed. The FSA has identified that there clearly is an issue here and has at least taken some steps to remedy. We hope that the review will result in the appropriate financial recompense that all victims of mis-selling are entitled to.

However, the review, in our opinion lacks bite and leaves a significant number of loose ends.

Non-sophisticated customers

To define “non-sophisticated customers”, the FSA has followed the criteria used in the Companies Act 2006 for classifying companies that are subject to the small companies regime. Therefore, a customer would be deemed non-sophisticated if it did not meet two of the following three criteria at the time the product was sold:-

1. A turnover of more that £6.5m 2. A balance sheet total of £3.26m 3. More than 50 employees.

In addition, the FSA has allowed the bank to categorise a customer as “sophisticated” even if it does not fall within the above definition if the bank can demonstrate that at the time of sale the customer had the necessary experience and knowledge to understand the product.

However, what if the customer does not agree with the bank’s allocation to a category? For example, what if the bank categorises a customer as sophisticated (so as to fall outside of the review) but the customer feels he should be deemed non-sophisticated? The bank’s assessment will be scrutinised by the independent reviewer. However, where there remains a dispute, the FSA envisages the customer will have to complain to the bank in person and, if that does not satisfactorily resolve the issue, make a further complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS). To be eligible to use this service you must have a turnover of less than €2m and fewer than 10 employees. All of which will take time (time a customer may not have, for reasons given below).

Sophisticated customers

If you are a sophisticated customer (on the definition above), you fall outside of the review. This is even the case if the bank previously classified you as a retail or private customer for regulatory purposes.

If you have been mis-sold a financial product, you will have to pursue the bank’s internal complaints procedure and, if not resolved satisfactorily, complain to the FOS, if you are eligible to do so. If you are not eligible to do so, you will have to take formal legal action through the Courts, all of which will take time.

Redress

The redress is to be calculated on the basis of what is fair and reasonable. However, the basis of the calculation of what is fair and reasonable has not been addressed. What happens if (we would say when) what a customer considers to be fair and reasonable (a full refund plus any consequential losses) is considerably different than what a bank considers to be fair and reasonable (for example redress based on an alternative fixed rate product)?

If the parties cannot agree on the level of redress, the customer either has to refer his complaint to the FSO or, if not eligible, will have to take formal legal action.

Insolvency of Customers

What if the customer has become insolvent since the product was taken out?

If a limited company has been dissolved, there is no legal entity to which any redress can be paid. Interested parties will need to take legal advice about whether they can have the limited company restored to the Companies House Register.

Timescales

Perhaps the biggest “loose end” of all is that the FSA has given no time limit within which the banks are required to fulfil their obligations under the agreement.

Whilst the banks are obliged to look at all hedge agreements sold on or after 1 December 2001, customers with a complaint will have to be mindful of limitation issues in the event that they do not reach a settlement with the banks.

It is important to bear in mind that the majority of these sales took place between 2006 and 2008. The Limitation Act 1980 provides that all contract/negligence claims must be commenced not more than 6 years from the date the action arose. In most cases, date the action arose is likely to be the inception date of the product (but there may other factors which could bring this date forward).

Those customers with complaints must be aware that, should there be any disagreement in relation to any/all of the factors referred to above, they will not be able to obtain legal assistance from the Courts once 6 years have elapsed from the date the action arose. This is so even if those loose ends referred to above have not been resolved and would leave complainants at the mercy of the banks (and the independent reviewer) if claims are not issued at Court by the relevant limitation date.

Conclusion

There are still significant potential problems for customers with complaints of mis-selling against banks. There is continued uncertainty and potential for disagreement in relation to a number of areas that may require court action to resolve. Crucially, the inability to successfully pursue a claim through Court after limitation expires means customers with complaints should not delay in contacting us to obtain urgent legal advice. We are able to quickly clarify clients’ positions and commence legal action to protect them should it be necessary.

At Steeles Law, we have acted, and continue to act, on behalf of a number of customers with complaints against banks and have significant experience with these disputes. We continue to act for those clients that have issued claims at Court and provide swift, assured and commercial legal advice to SME’s (and individuals). Do not hesitate to call us should you require legal assistance in this regard.

Ian Robotham

If you do require assistance please click here for Ian Robotham’s contact details and here for Nigel Lubbock’s contact details.

Bruno Peek’s remarkable life as a national and international Pageantmaster over more than 30 years has been brought to life in a colourful and illustrative new website from TMS Media.

It follows one of the Norfolk man’s proudest and most spectacular moments as he inspired and coordinated the lighting of more than 4,200 beacons around the world on June 4th 2012 in celebration of The Queen’s Diamond Jubilee.

Bruno had the honour of passing the Jubilee Crystal Diamond to The Queen that night to enable her to light the National beacon at the end of the BBC concert, watched by a TV audience of millions.

But the website, masterminded by TMS Media in Great Yarmouth, captures his story right back to his first key commission in 1981 when he organised Operation Sea Fire, a chain of 90 beacon fires lit around our coast to launch Maritime England for the English Tourist Board.

Since then he has guided pageants and events across the country and in Europe and Sri Lanka and is keen that all his experience and expertise should be channelled into future projects.

For the last 12 years TMS art director Nick Marshall has been chronicling those events and that personal profile of Bruno’s life forms the basis of the website. In recent years, he was a key figure in The Fly a Flag for Our Armed Forces initiative and the Great Poppy Party Weekend.

“The website simply tells an online audience who I am and what I can do – and it is something I want to continue doing to involve as many people as possible in some of the most significant and important occasions across Britain or abroad,” said Bruno, who lives in Gorleston.

TMS managing director Steve Scott added: “People are sometimes surprised that Bruno hits the headlines so often. But that is because he has spent decades at the helm of headline-hitting events which encourage thousands of people to join in and enjoy national celebrations.”

Visit: www.brunopeek.co.uk